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Dual Selfhood and Self-Perfection in Plotinus’ Enneads 
 
Suzanne Stern-Gillet 
 
Abstract: Plotinus’ theory of dual selfhood has ethical norms built into it, all of which derive 
from the ontological superiority of the higher (or undescended) soul in us over the body-
soul compound.  The moral life, as it is presented in the Enneads, is a life of self-perfection, 
devoted to the care of the higher self.  Such a conception of morality is prone to strike 
modern readers as either ‘egoistic’ or unduly austere.  If there is no doubt that Plotinus’ 
ethics is exceptionally austere, it will be argued below that it is not ‘egoistic’.  To that effect, 
the following questions will be addressed: Are the virtues, civic as well as purificatory, mere 
means to Plotinus’ metaphysically-conceived ethical goal?  To what extent must the lower 
self abnegate itself so as to enable the higher self to ascend to Intellect and beyond?  And if 
self-perfection lies at the centre of the Plotinian moral life, is there any conceptual room left 
in it for other-regarding norms of conduct?  A close reading of selected passages from 
Plotinus’ tractate (I.2[19] On Virtues and tractate VI.8[39] On Free Will and the Will of the One 
will, it is claimed, bring elements of answer to these questions.  
 
 
I 
Plotinus’ theory of dual selfhood is one of the best-known aspects of his philosophy.  Each of 
us, he taught, is both a compound of body and soul and a discarnate member of the 
hypostasis Intellect1.  As he wrote in a famous passage: 
… ‘we’ are used in two senses, either including the beast or referring to that 
which even in our present life transcends it.  The beast is the body which has 
been given life.  But the true man (ho d’alēthēs anthrōpos) is different, clear of these 
affections; he has the virtues which belong to the sphere of intellect and have 
their seat actually in the separate soul, separate and separable even while it is 
still here below. (I.1[53].10. 5-10)2 
Or, as he put the point more pithily in a slightly earlier tractate: 
... every man is double, one of him is the sort of compound being and one of him 
is himself (ho de autos).  (II.3.[52]. 9. 30-31) 
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As can be seen, Plotinus resorts to heavily value-loaded terminology to distinguish 
between the two ‘selves’ or ‘us’ (hēmeis).  The lower self is the empirical self, a compound of 
soul and body, and, as such, an entity extended in space and time (IV.4.13).  In the first of the 
two extracts above, Plotinus pointedly refers to the bodily part of the compound as a thērion 
(a beast), a word which in classical and post-classical usage refers to wild animals, such as 
lions, which are mostly hostile to humans.  To the extent that the metaphor suggests that the 
body might constitute a threat to ‘the true man’ in us, it aptly conveys Plotinus’ view that 
the body stands to be an obstacle to our higher self.  But if the body is an obstacle, it need 
not be an insurmountable obstacle.  Although ‘we’ are bound to ‘our’ body for the duration 
of our incarnate existence, the whole of our being is not inevitably determined by the needs 
and wants of the body.  We do have a degree of freedom.  What such degree of freedom 
consists in and how it can be safeguarded and exercised will be briefly considered below.   
      
The seat of our freedom is the higher self.  Plotinus closely associates the higher self 
with what he calls the ‘undescended soul’, namely the ‘part’ of our soul that has not 
descended from Intellect and, as a result, has remained unaffected by incarnation.  Like all 
other members of the Intelligible Principle, the undescended soul reflects, and is reflected 
by, the whole of that hypostasis.  Through the undescended soul, therefore, we are able, 
under certain conditions which will be investigated below, to behold Intellect, as well as the 
cause and origin of Intellect, the One.  The higher self, being closely related to the 
undescended soul and therefore ‘other’ than the body, is immune to the constraints of space 
and time, and impervious to corruption of any kind.  As such, it is choristos (separate, 
VI.4[22].14), even while we are still in the body.  This means that the higher self can be active 
on its own, without the support of the body, and that it will, in a manner that Plotinus never 
makes entirely clear, survive the death of the body.  In the wording of the second of the two 
extracts above, this self is truly what each of us is (cf. ho de autos, II.3.[52].9.31).   
 
As such, our higher self is inalienable; however much we yield to the promptings of 
the body, we can never irremediably sink to the level of ‘the beast’, at least not in the course 
of the life of the particular compound which constitutes our lower self.  Admittedly, we can, 
and often do, neglect our higher self.  We do so whenever we choose the more immediately 
gratifying life of the compound over the cultivation of the intelligible element in us.  To 
caution us against a life lived mainly at the level of the compound, Plotinus, as will be seen 
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below, not infrequently adopts a hortatory tone, presenting the higher self as an ideal to 
which ‘we’ must never cease to aspire.  How, if at all, he could defend his concept of the ‘we’ 
(hēmeis) as an agency capable of freely choosing between identifying itself (mostly) with the 
lower or (mostly) with the higher self is not a question that can be addressed in the present 
context.  How exactly he deals with some of the conflicts and paradoxes involved in 
presenting the higher self at one and the same time as a constituent part of our being and as 
an ideal is a question to which we shall turn in due course.    
 
II  
From the way that Plotinus presents the bifurcation between the two selves, it is clear that he 
has built ethical norms into it.  Although the body is not inherently bad or ugly - Plotinus is 
no Gnostic - the lower self, of which it is a part, nevertheless constitutes for ‘us’ a permanent 
and very real danger of alienation, a danger to which we must take care not to succumb, or 
not to succumb more than strictly necessary.  In this moral endeavour we stand to be helped 
by the virtues, which it behoves us therefore to cultivate.  Plotinus’ virtues are the traditional 
Greek virtues of wisdom, self-control (or moderation), courage and justice.  But if Plotinus’ 
list is the standard one, his conception of the virtues differs in a number of ways from that of 
Plato and Aristotle.  More specifically, Plotinus articulates the distinction, which is but 
embryonic in Plato,3 between two levels of virtue, a lower level of civic (politikai) virtues and 
a higher level of purificatory virtues (cf. katharseis).  Furthermore, as we shall see, Plotinus 
differs from Plato in explicitly ascribing instrumental, as opposed to intrinsic, value to the 
state of psychic harmony consequent upon the practice of the virtues.  As for Aristotle, 
although Plotinus is indebted to his description of individual virtues, he differs from him, as 
he does from Plato, in presenting the virtuous state, be it at the lower or higher level, as a 
stage to an end higher than itself, rather than as an end that is desirable in and for itself.  
Indeed, while, for Plotinus, the lower virtues are there to discipline the body-soul compound 
and prepare it for the practice of the higher virtues, the higher virtues themselves, in turn, 
serve the goal of fostering in the virtuous agent a steady aspiration to the higher realities as 
well as the ability to identify himself with his higher self.  Ultimately, therefore, Plotinus’ 
virtues are so many stepping stones to a state of being which Plotinus identifies with the 
Platonic ideal of ‘likeness to god’ (I.2 [19].1).4  The more advanced a person is on the road to 
likeness to god the less he will need to have his resolve strengthened and his vision 
sharpened by the virtues.  There is no call for virtue in the life of the divine. 
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The manner in which Plotinus articulated his distinction between the two orders of 
virtue strongly suggests that his ethics is but an offshoot of his metaphysics, and the moral 
life, in his view, but a preparation for union with Intellect and, possibly, the One.  To see 
whether, or to what extent, this is so, let us consider in some more detail the role that he 
assigned to the civic and the purificatory virtues in the life that he presented as the best for a 
human being to lead.   
 
The ‘civic’ (politicai) virtues are the virtues of the compound of soul and body, or lower 
self, and their sphere of application is defined by what Plotinus called the unlimitedness and 
unmeasuredness of incarnate life (I.2 [19]. 1):   
The civic virtues… do genuinely set us in order and make us better by giving 
limit and measure to our desires, and putting measure into all our experience; 
and they abolish false opinions, by what is altogether better and by the fact of 
limitation, and by the exclusion of the unmeasured and indefinite in accord with 
their measuredness; and they are themselves limited and clearly defined. (I.2 
[19].2) 
As characterized in these lines, the civic virtues ‘make us better’ by exercising the mostly 
negative function of limiting, lessening and excluding.  So doing, Plotinus argues, they tone 
and strengthen the soul in us, both intellectually and practically.  Intellectually, the civic 
virtues free us from false opinions by correcting our vision of the world around us and 
making us attentive to the evidence of the higher realities that it presents.5  Practically, they 
prepare us to undertake the process of dissociation from the life of the compound, a process 
that should ultimately enable us to become our higher self.  They fulfil their practical 
function by introducing order in, and between, our various desires, and thereby enabling us 
to withstand, so far as is possible, the pressure of bodily needs and wants.6   
 
The soul that has set itself in order by the practice of lower virtues is a soul that has 
taken the first step towards escaping from what Plotinus calls ‘the evils down here’ (I.2[19] 
1).  It is a soul that is ready to cultivate the higher, purificatory, virtues (cf. katharseis), which 
enable it to act (mostly) alone rather than (mostly) under the impulsion of the body.  The 
purificatory virtues channel the soul’s aspirations to the higher realities.  To the extent 
permitted by embodiment, they enable the virtuous person to engage in the process of 
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dissociating himself from the compound and of identifying with his higher self.  So doing, 
they contribute to bringing about in him a ‘likeness to the divine’.   
 
From ‘the evils down here’ to ‘likeness to the divine’, the progression is steep and the 
ideal exceptionally austere and unworldly.  Just how austere and unworldly is a life lived 
according to the purificatory virtues is evident from the following lines:  
Since the soul is evil when it is thoroughly mixed with the body and shares its 
experiences and has all the same opinions, it will be good and possess virtue 
when it no longer has the same opinions but acts alone – this is intelligence and 
wisdom (noein te kai phronein) – and does not share the body’s experience – this is 
self-control - and is not afraid of departing from the body – this is courage – and 
is ruled by reason and intellect, without opposition – and this is justice. (I.2 
[19].3) 
While the practice of the civic virtues enables us to deal with the frailties of the incarnate 
condition, the cultivation of the purificatory virtues, as this passage shows, makes possible   
detachment from the body.  Yet, as Plotinus keenly stresses, detachment from the body, for 
all its considerable merit, is not for the virtuous soul the ultimate achievement.  The process 
of purification is less perfect than the achieved state.  In the achieved state of fellowship with 
the divine, the purified soul actively beholds the vision for which the purificatory process of 
‘stripping away everything alien’ (aphairesis allotriou pantos, I.2[19].4.6) had prepared her.  
While the practice of the purificatory virtues is the toilsome preparation for the vision, the 
vision itself is the end point of the soul’s conversion and purification.  It is the point at which 
the soul is returned to the higher realities of its origins and beholds the Forms in Intellect, of 
which it had so far only had impressions (tupoi I.2 [19]. 3-4).   
 
 Admittedly, the relationship between purification and vision is no simple, 
chronologically determined, means-end relationship.  To undertake the toilsome process of 
self-purification, a soul needs to have some notion of its own nature and destiny as well as 
of the nature of the end to which it will toil.  It needs to be able to anticipate, in however 
confused a manner, the rewards of the vision in which the purificatory process will 
culminate.  To some extent, therefore, any soul that engages in the process of purification 
must already have turned itself to the higher realities that it stands to behold at the end of 
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the process.  Plotinus expresses the delicate relationship between conversion, purification 
and vision in the following lines: 
... it [the soul] must attain to this fellowship after being purified; and it will do so 
by a conversion.  Does it then turn itself after purification? Rather, after the 
purification it is already turned.  Is this, then, its virtue?  It is rather that which 
results for it from the conversion.  And what is this? A sight and the impression 
of what is seen, implanted and working in it, like the relationship between sight 
and its object.  But did it not have the realities which it sees? ... It did not have 
the realities themselves but impressions (tupous) of them; so it must bring the 
impressions in accord with the true realities of which they are impressions. 
(chapter 4)7  
If the exercise of the purificatory virtues thus presupposes on the part of the virtuous person 
some conception of the end, it none the less constitutes but a stage in the realisation of the 
soul’s return to its origins and true nature.  Even in its highest form, therefore, the virtuous 
state is valuable only for what it contributes to bringing about.  
  
              It can at this point be concluded that Plotinus’ virtues, both civic and purificatory, 
are stages towards a state of being higher than themselves.  While the civic virtues, which 
specifically involve the body, are steps towards the higher, purificatory virtues, the 
purificatory virtues themselves, which are the virtues of the soul ‘acting alone’, enable it to 
prepare itself for reaching the divine.  So much, but no more, can the purificatory virtues do.  
The state of ‘god-likeness’, which Plotinus sees as the apex of the moral life, lies beyond 
even them.  But if both kinds of virtues can, to that extent, be described as instrumental, 
their value as instruments greatly differs.  Once the civic virtues have fulfilled their function 
of bringing the virtuous person to the point of being able to cultivate the higher virtues, their 
task is complete.  Their role, so to speak, had been to make themselves redundant.  In the 
ordinary course of the incarnate life of a god-like soul, they need never intervene again.  The 
purificatory virtues, on the other hand, which are intimately linked with the contemplative 
life, will continue to sustain the god-like soul for as long as it remains ‘here below’.  As 
Plotinus writes at the conclusion of the tractate: 
... when he [the virtuous person] reaches higher principles and different 
measures he will act according to these.  For instance, he will not make self-
control consist in that former observance of measure and limit, but will altogether 
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dissociate himself, as far as possible, from his lower nature and will not live the life of the 
good man which civic virtue requires.  He will leave that behind, and choose 
another, the life of the gods: for it is to them, not to good men, that we are to be 
made like ... likeness to the gods is likeness to the model, a being of a different 
kind to ourselves’. (I.2[19].7) 
By this, Plotinus does not mean that once the soul has become god-like, it will cease to have 
the civic virtues and cultivate only the purificatory virtues.  Far from it since, like most 
Greek philosophers before him, Plotinus does believe in the unity of the virtues.8  What he 
does mean in the above lines, as will presently be seen, is that it is only in extreme 
circumstances, such as brought about by war, that the god-like soul will have any occasion 
to practice the civic virtues.   
 
This proviso notwithstanding, it can be concluded that in the philosophy of the 
Enneads ethics is a maidservant to metaphysics.  If the Plotinian virtuous agent must seek to 
be a good man, it is mainly so that he can, in turn, raise himself to the state of god-likeness, 
thereby becoming like those whose perfection precludes the need for virtue.   
 
III 
The manner in which Plotinus theorizes the hierarchy between two orders of virtue strongly 
suggests that his belief in the perfectibility of human beings is the cement that ties his ethics 
to his metaphysics.9  As shown above, the purificatory virtues are essentially virtues of self-
perfection.  So much does the ideal of self-perfection dominate Plotinus’ discussion of the 
virtues in I.2 [19] that beneficence and its attendant norms and duties are almost completely 
overshadowed as a result.  Furthermore, to the extent that the main function of the civic 
virtues is to prepare us for the practice of the purificatory virtues, it can be said that they, 
too, are, to a not inconsiderable extent, virtues of self-perfection.  In Plotinus’ ethics, 
therefore, every single virtue, whether civic or purificatory, is, directly or indirectly, 
focussed on the care of the (higher) self of the virtuous person rather than on the care of the 
self (higher or lower) of others.  No explicitly ‘other-directed’ norms feature in the account 
of virtue provided in tractate I.2[19] and no mention is made of the commitments and 
obligations that moral agents might have either to their philoi or to the state of which they 
are members.  Even in his definition of higher justice, where one would most expect to find 
them, Plotinus makes no reference to the claims of others upon the virtuous agent: 
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True, absolute justice is the disposition of a unity to itself (oikeiopragia), a unity in 
which there are no different parts.  So the higher justice in the soul is its activity 
towards Intellect.’ (I.2 [19]. 6) 
From the evidence of these lines it should come as no surprise, therefore, to find no decisive 
support either in this tractate or in others for the view that Plotinus was interested in 
extending his concept of justice in the individual soul to the city as a whole.10     
 
Plotinus’ highly metaphysical interpretation of the hierarchy between civic and 
purificatory virtues as well as the central role that he assigns to the process of ‘stripping 
away everything that is alien’ (I.2 [19].4. 6) in the practice of the purificatory virtues warrant 
the further conclusion that the Plotinian virtues are to be exercised, mainly though not 
exclusively, in the privacy of one’s own life.  Indeed, under the heading of ‘alien’, we can 
surmise that he would have included most, if not all, aspects of our earthly existence: 
material possessions, no doubt, but also habits, interests of various kinds, attachments to 
persons and places, most of what makes the incarnate life what it is, which means most of 
the properties that make us the singular persons that we are.11  The Plotinian ascent to the 
higher self, in other words, presupposes distancing oneself from ordinary psychic and social 
life. 
 
IV 
The heavy emphasis laid on self-perfection and the care of the higher self in Plotinus’ 
conception of the higher virtuous life is prone to raise ethical problems in the mind of 
modern readers.  Can the demands of self-perfection, these readers may wonder first, be 
combined with the reality of our commitments to others, commitments into which we were 
born or which we have subsequently voluntarily entered into?  If Plotinus’ view, as inferred 
from his argument in tractate I.2[19], is that self-perfection must take precedence over other 
considerations, is his ethics to be labelled ‘egoistic’ as a result?  Secondly, the same readers 
may inquire, how far does Plotinus think that the lower self, once it has acquired the civic 
virtues, must go in promoting the interest of its higher twin?  What amount of self-sacrifice 
on its part is suggested in the advice to discard ‘everything alien’?  Could the lower self have 
to go as far as consenting to its own demise when circumstances are so extreme as not to 
permit the survival of both selves?  To these questions, I now turn, after making two general 
points. 
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Let it be noted, to begin with, that the first of the two conflicts mentioned above, far 
from being peculiar to the Enneads, arises in other ancient systems of ethics.  In envisaging in 
the Republic that philosophers would have to be compelled (anagkasteoi, VII 539 E 3) to return 
to the Cave, and in having Adeimantus protest that the philosophers’ engagement in 
practical affairs might not bring them personal happiness (IV 419 A 1-3), Plato recognised 
the possibility of conflicts between the pursuit of the theoretic life and the demands of civic 
life.  Ultimately, as we know, he had Socrates resolve the issue by claiming that the 
discharge of their public duties would constitute for philosophers a source of great 
happiness (ibid., 420 B 4-5).  As it has come down to us, the Nicomachean Ethics, too, leaves 
acute the problem of the nature of the best and most fulfilling life for a human being to lead, 
whether it be the ‘practical’ life of politics, as books I to IX would have it, or the theoretic life 
of contemplation, as it is claimed in chapters 7 and 8 of book X.  Unlike Plato, however, 
Aristotle did not explicitly seek to resolve the conflict that is opened up in his ethics.  The 
reason, for all we know, may be that book X was composed at a different time, or for a 
different context, from the other nine books.  But, whatever the reason, the conflict is glaring 
and the consistency of Aristotle’s ethics requires that it be addressed.  In the Enneads, 
however, matters stand otherwise.  Unlike Plato, Plotinus does not recognize explicitly that 
the demands of action might be thought to conflict with those of contemplation.  Unlike the 
text of the Nicomachean Ethics, that of the Enneads is free of conflicting pronouncements on 
the nature of the best life for a human being to lead.   
 
As for the worry that Plotinus’s ethics might have to be labelled ‘egoistic’ as a result 
of the emphasis laid in it on the self-perfection of the agent, it is a modern worry.  ‘Egoistic’ 
tend to carry negative connotations in modern parlance, if not always in modern systems of 
ethics.  Modern commentators, therefore, who either deplore the ‘egoistic’ nature of 
Plotinus’ ethics12 or, on the contrary, profess to find in it norms of other-regarding conduct13 
do so on the strength of a modern concept.  Is the concept useful in the discussion of 
Plotinus’ ethics?  Is it even applicable to it?14   
 
As theorized in modern thought, ‘egoism’ designates either a psychological or an 
ethical thesis.  Psychological egoism is a theory about human motivation which centres on 
the descriptive claim that human beings have a natural tendency to further their own self-
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interest before attending to the interest of others.  Ethical egoism is a normative theory 
according to which human beings ought only to act from self-interest.  What makes the 
theory ethical is the justification that accompanies its central claim, namely that ‘it is for the 
best if everyone ... pursues his or her own interest’15, or, more precisely, that the common 
good is the end product of the pursuit, by each one of us, of our own interest.16  Since self-
interest as well as the common good can be conceived in more than one way, ethical egoism 
presents a number of variants.17  
 
There is no sign in the Enneads that Plotinus ever subscribed to psychological egoism.  
As for ethical egoism, the issue is not, prima facie, clear-cut.  As we saw, Plotinus’ paragon of 
virtue, having become dissociated from his empirical self and assimilated to his higher self, 
has set himself up amongst the intelligible realities.  As far as his incarnate condition 
permits, he has left the body and its concerns behind, and is leading the best possible human 
life.  In so far as Plotinus’ ethics is focussed on the promotion of the higher self, therefore, it 
can be said to be ‘self-centred’18 by definition.   
 
Does that make it ‘egoistic’?  Not really, or so I would argue.  The self that lies at the 
centre of Plotinus’ ethics differs in a number of crucial ways from the self whose interest is 
promoted by ethical egoism.  The self of ethical egoism corresponds to Plotinus’ lower self.  
It is an empirical, embodied, self, a self whose needs and wants are determined by appetite, 
desire and passion, as well as by reason.  It is essentially a social self which depends upon 
others for survival and fulfilment, and which must share competitive goods of all kinds with 
others.  Accordingly, its virtues are of a kind that cannot be exercised outside a community.  
They are thus truly civic, unlike the virtues that go under that description in Plotinus’ 
terminology.  
 
The self that Plotinus urges us to cultivate is of an entirely different order.  It is a self 
that has mostly transcended the compound and its associated opinions and affects, the latter 
of which include emotions such as envy, jealousy, pity (I.1[53].10.14), as well as love of 
particular persons rather of ‘all that is akin’ (II.9[33].16.8-9).  It is a self that is unconcerned 
and unperturbed by the contingencies and tribulations of earthly existence.  As Plotinus 
rhetorically asks in the tractate on Well-Being: ‘What human circumstance is so great that a 
man will not think little of it who has climbed higher than all this and depends on nothing 
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below?’ (I.4[46].7.14-17]  It is a self that does not engage in calculation of losses and gains or 
seeks to balance short-term against long-term self-interest.  What it aspires to cannot be an 
object of competition.  Not only can it be active on its own, but its access to the higher 
realities largely depends on its ascending to them in solitude.19  Its specific virtues, therefore, 
are mostly practised outside a social context.  ‘Self-centred’ though Plotinus’ ethics be, the 
self that constitutes its focus is therefore not the self with which ethical egoists concern 
themselves. 
 
If the higher self proves too ethereal an entity to be identified with the self of ethical 
egoism, the question arises none the less as to how a person possessing the higher virtues 
would deal with the two conflicts mentioned above, namely the conflict between his own 
interest and that of others and the conflict between his commitment to the higher self and 
the necessity to attend to (some of) the needs of the compound.  Far from ignoring these 
issues, Plotinus deals with them, albeit briefly, in tractate VI.8 [39], on Free Will and the Will of 
the One, in the context of a discussion of free will.  Plotinus’ main purpose in the tractate is to 
establish whether or not the One, which cannot be other than it is, can nevertheless be said 
to be free.  To hone his concepts for this important investigation, Plotinus devotes the first 
six chapters of the tractate to an enquiry into the nature and extent of human freedom.  
Briefly summarized, his position is as follows.  Besides being subject to chance, humans are 
prone to be enslaved by their passions as well as by external circumstances.  Yet they can 
free themselves from both kinds of bondage.  Neither chance nor passion nor external 
circumstances have any unshakeable power to constrain the sage.  For the sage, in 
conquering his lower, empirical, self by the practice of the civic virtues, ipso facto makes 
himself immune to most external factors which, until then, had held him in their power.  So 
doing, he assimilates himself to his higher self. Plotinian freedom, therefore, which is 
internally related to the good, is mostly restricted to the life of contemplation.   
 
Is it likely, however, that the sage, for all his autonomy and serenity, will forever 
remain unaffected by circumtance?  Is he likely to be able altogether to avoid becoming 
involved in practical affairs?  And, if he cannot avoid it, we shall want to ask to what extent 
he will remain free when so engaged?  Plotinus seems to have anticipated the question.  In 
chapter 5 of the tractate he addresses the issue of possible conflicts between the demands of 
contemplation and those of action, between what we must do for the sake of our higher self 
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and what we must do for the sake of those around us.  He recognizes that there are 
circumstances, such as war, injustice and poverty, in which the sage will have to intervene in 
practical affairs, even though such intervention will compromise his freedom.  Indeed, since 
the attainment (teuxis) of any action intended to have an impact on the world outside 
ultimately depends on factors outside the agent’s control, the outcome of any action cannot 
ever be wholly within the agent’s control.  For this reason, the sage’s involvement in the 
world outside will be reluctant, and remain curative, rather than being preventive.  If virtue 
itself were asked, Plotinus adds, it would always prefer not to be called upon to intervene in 
practical affairs: 
… if someone gave virtue itself the choice whether it would like in order to be 
active that there should be wars, that it might be brave, and that there should be 
injustice that it might define what is just and set things in order, and poverty, 
that it might display its liberality, or to stay quiet because everything was well, it 
would choose to rest from its practical activities because nothing needed its 
curative action, as if a physician, for instance Hippocrates, were to wish that 
nobody needed his skill. (VI.8[39].5.13-20) 
From these lines, we may infer that the sage’s disengagement from practical affairs need not 
be total.  Although he will not be on the look out for opportunities to relieve the acute 
distress of others, he will nevertheless not shirk the burden of doing so whenever he is 
uniquely placed to help out. But, even then, he will take care that his interventions in the 
affairs of others remain curative only and hope that they will not have to be so frequent as to 
compromise the freedom of his soul or undermine his ability to ascend to the intelligible 
order.  Rather than a monster of indifference, it seems, the Plotinian sage is a paradigm of 
rational aloofness.   
 
Just how aloof the sage has it in him to be emerges from chapter 6 of the same tractate, 
in which Plotinus moves from considering how the sage will react in extreme circumstances 
affecting others to how he will react when he himself stands to be affected.  Unfortunately, 
the syntax of the passage is confusing, and the reading that is grammatically the more likely, 
if not the only one possible, turns out to be the one that is also the more counter-intuitive to 
modern readers.  In my translation the passage reads as follows:20    
 … for she [virtue] will not attend to practical affairs, such as saving someone in 
danger (ton kinduneuonta), but, if she should see fit, she will forsake this one 
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(touton), and enjoin the forsaking of life, as well as of riches and children, and 
even of the fatherland.  For virtue keeps the fine as its goal, but not the existence 
of what is subject to her.  So that both self-determination in the realm of actions 
and what is in one’s own power do not refer to the acting itself nor to external 
activity, but to the activity of what is within and to the thought and 
contemplation of virtue itself (i.e. the contemplation that virtue itself engages in).  
But one must say of this virtue that she is a kind of intellect, not counting the 
passions in with her, the passions that are enslaved and brought into measure by 
reason, for these, as he [Plato] says, seem to be in close relationship with the 
body since it is by habits and training that they are put right.  (VI.8[39].6.14-26) 
 
The main difficulty of the passage is the identity of ‘the man in danger’ (ton 
kinduneuonta, l. 15), to whom it is clear that the demonstrative ‘this one’ (touton, l. 16) refers.  
Who is the man in danger?  Is he the virtuous agent himself or someone else?  Furthermore, 
what exactly does Plotinus mean when he makes virtue enjoin the forsaking of children and 
country?  In my reading, which is also that of Bréhier and of the most recent French 
translation of the tractate,21 the man in danger is the agent himself or, more precisely, the 
body with which the soul of the agent is conjoined at the time.  By referring to the body as 
ton kinduneuonta, Plotinus uses style, rather subtly, to point to the otherness of what is in 
danger: the body, the empirical self, which is other than the real self of the agent.  If the 
circumstances warrant it, virtue will enjoin (keleuein) the agent to forsake this body (touton), 
which is an essential part of his empirical self.   
From virtue’s command, so interpreted, the rest of the sentence follows naturally.  The 
object to be forsaken (cf. proiemenēn and proiesthai, l. 16), namely life (cf. to dzen, l. 16), refers 
to the life of the agent himself: forsaking his own body, he must forsake his bodily life itself.  
Letting go of his bodily life, he must, in turn, let go of his material possessions as well as, 
more grievously, his relationship with his children.  From a philosophical point of view, this 
reading is in line with Plotinus’ teaching that the death of the body is a lesser evil for the 
sage than the subordination of his soul to the survival instinct of his body.  As the passage 
makes plain, the principal aim of virtue, in Plotinus’ viewpoint, is to secure ‘the fine’ (to 
kalon) for herself (ll. 17-18) and not, as one might expect, the good of ‘what is subject to her’ 
(l. 18).  Indeed, ‘what is subject to her’ is external and, as such, not within her control, hence 
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outside her remit.  Of all that is outside virtue’s control - riches, the fatherland, children, 
bolily life itself - the Plotinian sage must let go.  And he must do so in the name of moral 
norms higher than those embodied in the social virtues.   
The passage taken from chapter 6 of Ennead VI.8, therefore, in its context, yields a clear 
picture of the Plotinian sage.  His virtue is of the higher, purificatory, order.  This virtue has 
intellectualised his soul, oriented him to the good, freed him from the passions and ensured 
that the premises of his actions are truly within his control.  If he obeys the commands 
(keleuein) of virtue, he does so freely, even when they require of him what would be for most 
human beings the ultimate self-sacrifice.  In the interest of the kalon, which is also that of his 
higher self, he forsakes most, if not all, of what would otherwise be considered to make the 
incarnate life bearable. 
 
V 
In Plotinus’ metaphysically-derived ethics, the best life for a human being to lead is a life of 
self-perfection, devoted to the care of the higher self.   In the pursuit of this end, the sage will 
cultivate the civic and purificatory virtues, and lead a life of austerity, denying satisfaction 
to such appetites and desires as might compromise his soul’s ability to elevate itself to the 
higher realities.  If necessary, he will sacrifice his bodily well-being and, in extreme 
circumstances, be prepared to forsake even life itself to the integrity of his higher self.  What, 
in contrast, the sage is not prepared to do, is to sacrifice the life of others to the interest of his 
higher self.  Indeed, while he will not readily engage in practical affairs, he will none the less 
not hesitate to do so when he finds himself uniquely able to avert disaster for others.  This 
assymmetry, together with Plotinus’s highly ascetic conception of the life of higher selfhood, 
render the label ‘egoistic’ inapplicable to Plotinus’ ethics.22          
 
The University of Bolton 
 
 
 
15 
 
     
                                                 
1 Throughout this essay, I shall use ‘Intellect’ and ‘Intelligible Principle’ interchangeably to refer to the 
hypostasis emanated from the One.  
2 Unless otherwise specified, all quotations from the Enneads will be in A.H. Armstrong’s translation. 
3 See, e.g., Republic VI, 500 D. 
4 See, e.g. Theaetetus 176 A-B.  On the issue of` Plato’s influence on Plotinus on this particular point, 
see Sedley (1999: 322-23).  
5 See also V 3[49]. 
6 As chapter V of the tractate makes plain, Plotinus is not so unworldly as to ignore, or even 
downplay, the difficulties that embodied souls inevitably face when in their attempt to dissociate 
themselves from the body.  
7 For a particularly apt commentary on the chapter from which these lines are taken, see J.-M. 
Flamand, in Plotin, Traités 7-21, présentés, traduits et annotés, sous la direction de L. Brisson et J.-F. 
Pradeau, Paris: GF Flammarion, 2003, pp. 455-457.   
8 See I.2[19].7.  
9 The importance of the notion of self-perfection in Plotinus’ philosophy had already been noted by 
John Passmore (1970) in his study of the history of the concept of human perfectibility in Western 
philosophy. 
10 Could Porphyry’s report in the Vita Plotini (12) that Plotinus had intended to revive the city of 
philosophers fallen into ruins in Campania, and to persuade it to live according to the laws of Plato be 
taken as evidence of Plotinus’ practical interest in political matters?  Possibly.  Yet no inference can be 
drawn from this anecdote on the nature of Plotinus’ political philosophy, if indeed he ever evolved 
one.  Although there is no reason to doubt Porphyry’s veracity in the matter, the disciple’s mere word 
is no sufficient ground to ascribe to the master an interest in political matters that is not otherwise 
documented in his writings.  In Platonopolis (2003), Dominic O’Meara argues that the Enneads do 
contain evidence of Plotinus’ theoretical interest in political matters.  This claim is challenged in my 
‘Plotinus and the Moral Point of View’, forthcoming.  
11 This is also likely to be presupposed in Plotinus’ account of mystical union, in the course of which 
the contemplator withdraws from all that is outside himself in order to behold the intelligible realities 
within his soul (IV.8 [6].1).  See also V.3[49].17.38: aphele panta (‘take away everything’).   
12 See, e.g., Arnou who claims that Plotinus advocated ‘a certain form of egoism masquerading as 
disinterestedness’ and that the Enneads are notable for their ‘negation of solidarity and any form of 
responsibility.’ (1921: 44, my translation and italics). 
13 See, e.g., Schniewind (2000b and 2003). 
14 Annas (1993: 225-26) convincingly argues that it is anachronistic to map the modern dichotomy 
between egoism and altruism to ancient systems of ethics.    
15 Williams (1985: 13). 
16 Frankena (1963: 16-23). 
17 From Hobbes’ Leviathan and Mandeville’s The Fable of the Bees to M. Stirner’s The Ego and Its Own 
and A. Rand’s The Virtue of Selfishness: a New Concept of Egoism Ethical. 
18 I borrow the phrase from John Dillon’s seminal article ‘An Ethic for the Late Antique Sage’, in 
Gerson (ed.) (1996). 
19 See I.6[1].7.9, VI.9[9].11.51 and VI.7[38].34.7-8. 
20 Constraints of space here rule out a detailed examination of the grammatical difficulties of the 
Greek passage.  They are discussed in detail in my ‘Plotinus and the Moral Point of View’, 
forthcoming. 
16 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
21 The translation is question is that of Lavaud (2007) in Plotin, Traités 38-41, presentés, traduits et 
annotés, sous la direction de L. Brisson et J.-F. Pradeau, Paris: GF Flammarion.  
22 A distant ancestor of the present paper was read of the 2004 conference of the American Philological 
Association in 2003, and a not so distant ancestor was presented at the 2007 conference of the Ancient 
Philosophy Society, held at Boston College.  In both cases, I much benefited from the discussion that 
ensued. Especial thanks are due to Gary Gurtler S.J., Denis O’Brien, Pauliina Remes, Svetla Slaveva-
Griffin and Stephanie Semler for their willingness to engage with the issues discussed in the paper. 
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